













Title: The concept of child and its legal synonyms in Polish criminal law 
 
Author: Olga Sitarz, Anna Jaworska-Wieloch 
 
Citation style: Sitarz Olga, Jaworska-Wieloch Anna. (2021). The concept of 
child and its legal synonyms in Polish criminal law. "International and 
Comparative Law Review" (2021, no. 1, s. 211-226), DOI: 10.2478/iclr-2021-
0008 
 
ICLR, 2021, Vol. 21, No. 1.
211
Published by Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic, 2021.  
ISSN (print): 1213-8770; ISSN (online): 2464-6601
THE CONCEPT OF CHILD AND ITS LEGAL 
SYNONYMS IN POLISH CRIMINAL LAW 
Olga Sitarz
University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland 
olga.sitarz@us.edu.pl
Anna Jaworska-Wieloch 
University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland
anna.jaworska-wieloch@us.edu.pl
SITARZ, Olga; JAWORSKA-WIELOCH, Anna. The Concept of Child and its 
Legal Synonyms in Polish Criminal Law. International and Comparative Law 
Review, 2021, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 211–226. DOI: 10.2478/iclr-2021-0008.
Summary: Criminal law, which uses the strictest measures at the disposal of the legisla-
tor, requires particular caution in the interpretation of the concepts appearing in the 
repressive law. The concept of a child in criminal law cause many problems of interpre-
tation, as it appears in many legal acts in a different sense. The publication is devoted 
to presenting the concept of a child in various legal acts and reflecting on the different 
meanings of the descriptions of the child made by the legislator and the legitimacy of 
the differentiations made by him. The question arises as to whether the creation of many 
different concepts describing a child is justified.
Keywords: child, minor, youthful, legal synonyms, interpretation.
1 Introduction
Any discussion on criminal law aspects relating to the child must take into 
account the normative scope of the concept of the child or the corresponding 
synonyms used by the legislator. It appears that the otherwise clear and compre-
hensible concept of „child“ poses numerous interpretative difficulties at the level 
of law.1
This study will focus on an analysis of the Polish regulations. This will allow 
for the identification of similarities and differences between Polish legal system 
and international human rights standards. More importantly, the comparative 
model of this study will also make it possible to check which legislative solutions 
1 Cf. GRONOWSKA, Bożena, JASUDOWICZ, Tadeusz, MIK, Cezary, O prawach dziecka, 
Comer, Toruń 1994, p. 11.
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fit into international law and at the same time are functional, correct and effec-
tive for a proper response to acts committed against children and by children.
Firstly, the child and the synonymous concepts in the Polish legal order 
is defined not by reference to the characteristics of such a person, but strictly 
formally by determining the age at which the attribute of childhood is updat-
ed. Although such a system seems unambiguous and free from burdensome 
arrangements made for each person (as regards having specific characteristics, 
e.g. lack of maturity), it is full of pitfalls and uncertainties, as will appear below. 
Problems may also arise from the designation of a specific moment, e.g. reaching 
the age of 18 (the question is whether it is the midnight that marks the beginning 
or ending of day, or it is rather a specific time related to the time of birth). In the 
Polish system, this issue has not been clearly resolved.2
2 About the concept of a child on an international basis
A proper analysis of legal terms cannot ignore comments on the concept 
of the child included in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Pursuant 
to its Art. 1, “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every 
human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable 
to the child, majority is attained earlier.” As concluded in the Implementation 
Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “Setting an age for the 
acquisition of certain rights or for the loss of certain protections is a complex 
matter. It balances the concept of the child as a subject of rights whose evolving 
capacities must be respected (acknowledged in articles 5 and 14) with the con-
cept of the State’s obligation to provide special protection.”3 
Given that in the course of work on the Convention it was impossible to 
achieve unanimity as to the declaration on the beginning of the child’s life, a 
formula was adopted which did not prejudge that issue, and the Chairman-
Rapporteur of the Working Group submitted a declaration on its behalf stating 
that the Working Group did not seek to prejudge the interpretation of Art. 1 or 
any other provision of the Convention.4 It leads to a certain ambiguity because 
the preamble to the Convention states that „the child, by reason of his physical 
and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate 
legal protection, before as well as after birth.” Nonetheless, the literature review 
2 Cf. further: NAWROCKI, Mariusz, O sposobie ustalania dolnej granicy wieku 
odpowiedzialności karnej, Państwo i Prawo 2019, no 9, pp. 85–93.
3 Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, prepared for 
UNICEF by Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell, 2007, p. 1. [online]. Available at: http://
www.unicef.org.tr/files/bilgimerkezi/doc/Implementation_Handbook_for_the_Conven-
tion_on_the_Rights_of_the_Child.pdf, Accessed: 28.11.2019
4 DETRICK, Sharon (eds.) The United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child. A Guide 
to the “Travaux Preparatoires.” Dordrecht – Boston – London 1992, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 110.
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shows that the entire content of the Convention is focused on the promotion and 
protection of the rights of the born child.5
The acceptance of the principle that a person ceases to be regarded as a child 
upon attaining the age of eighteen is in essence maximalist. It mainly takes into 
account the European and North American standards. In the course of work on 
the Convention, numerous delegations brought forward proposals for the age 
limit to be fixed at 15 or even 14 years of age (which would correlate with the 
completion of compulsory schooling and the right to found a family in force 
in some countries).6 In order to take into account the experience of different 
countries and reach an agreement, a flexible formula was adopted allowing for a 
conclusion that childhood ends before the age of 18, with no permissible mini-
mum age limit being set. Various attempts were made to determine the child‘s 
maturity, but in the absence of consensus, no criterion for such maturity was 
specified in the Convention.7 Still, “the Committee has emphasized that, when 
States define minimum ages in legislation, they must do so in the context of the 
basic principles within the Convention, in particular the principle of nondis-
crimination (Article 2, for example challenging different marriage ages for boys 
and girls), as well as the principles of best interests of the child (Article 3) and 
the right to life and maximum survival and development (Article 6). There must 
be respect for the child’s “evolving capacities” (Article 5): in General Comment 
No. 7 on “Implementing child rights in early childhood,” the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child underlines that “young children are holders of all the rights 
enshrined in the Convention.”8
In his analysis of the provisions of the Convention regarding the concept of 
the child, Adam Łopatka raises the question whether a country being in com-
pliance with the Convention may assume that childhood ends later than upon 
attaining the age of 18. It is important in the light of Art. 41 of the Convention 
reading as follows: “Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provi-
sions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and 
which may be contained in: (a) The law of a State party; or (b) International law 
in force for that State.” The answer to that question depends on whether we rec-
ognize that care, attention, and adequate legal protection necessary for a physi-
cally and mentally immature person are beneficial to the person who reached 
5 ŁOPATKA, Adam, Kto jest dzieckiem? In ŁOPATKA, Adam, (eds.), Konwencja o prawach 
dziecka a prawo polskie. Materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w gmachu Sejmu 
RP w dniach 19–20 maja 1991 r., Warsaw 1991, p. 19.
6 MICHALSKA, Anna, Międzynarodowa ochrona praw dziecka w ONZ, Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, 1985, no. 1, pp. 12–13.
7 BALCEREK, Marian, Międzynarodowa ochrona praw dziecka, Warsaw: Wydawnictwa 
Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1988, p. 155.
8 Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, prepared for 
UNICEF by Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell, 2007, p. 1. [online]. Available at:
 http://www.unicef.org.tr/files/bilgimerkezi/doc/Implementation_Handbook_for_the_
Convention_on_the_Rights_of_the_Child.pdf, Accessed: 28.11.2019
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maturity. Adam Łopatka is of the opinion that what is beneficial for a child can 
be embarrassing and become a burden for a physically and mentally mature per-
son.9
Irrespective of the age criterion adopted in the Convention, individual provi-
sions of the Convention relate to children in selected age categories, taking into 
account the special needs of a child at a certain age, its particular sensitivity, as 
well as the growing independence of the child. By way of illustration, the young-
est children are referred to in Art. 7 point 1 of the Convention stating that a 
birth certificate should be issued immediately after birth at which point the child 
has the right to a name and right to acquire a nationality. In contrast, as regards 
combating the illicit transfer and non-return of children abroad (Art. 11), no 
age limits are set. That is different in the case of the participation of children in 
warfare. Pursuant to Art. 38 (2) of the Convention, States Parties shall take all 
feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen 
do not take a direct part in hostilities.
3 About the concept of a child in Polish criminal law
In Polish criminal law, the term child is virtually non-existent. The Criminal 
Code uses that concept only a few times and, it seems, more often in the sense 
of a descendant rather than young being. Currently, in Polish substantive crimi-
nal law, the concept of the child as a victim is synonymous with the concept of 
a minor, whereas the term juvenile is used to describe a child who commits a 
prohibited act. It must be acknowledged that the legislator has not been entirely 
consistent in that area, and the historical development of the above terms and 
their ranges are a good illustration of the past and present terminological chaos. 
The first part of this article will present ways to define the child as a victim in 
the Polish criminal codes adopted in the 20th century. They include the pre-war 
Criminal Code of 1932, the socialist Criminal Code of 1969 and the currently 
effective Criminal Code of 1997, which has thus far been subject to numerous 
amendments. The following list includes concepts that refer directly to non-adult 
victims or concepts that relate both to adult and child victims.
Thus, the Criminal Code of 1932 applied the following concepts do define 
non-adult victims: 
• juvenile under the age of 15 (Art. 213), juvenile under the age of 17 (Art. 
158, Art. 199, Art. 246) and juvenile under the age of 21 (Art. 212), 
• child (Art. 200, Art. 212, Art. 226), 
• person under the age of 15 (Art. 203) 
9 ŁOPATKA, Adam, Kto jest dzieckiem? In ŁOPATKA, Adam, (eds.), Konwencja o prawach 
dziecka a prawo polskie. Materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej w gmachu Sejmu 
RP w dniach 19–20 maja 1991 r., Warsaw 1991, pp. 20–21.
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and as a sui generis synonym for non-adult: 
• person to whom a duty to take care or provide supervision is owed (Art. 
242 § 2, Art. 243), as well as:
• person being in a relation of dependence (Art. 246).
The provisions of the Criminal Code of 1969 applied the following terms: 
• child (Art. 149, Art. 186 § 1), 
• person to whom a duty of care is owed (Art. 160 § 2, Art. 163), 
• person under the age of 15 (Art. 176, Art. 177, Art. 187), 
• minor (Art. 184, Art. 185, Art. 188).
The Criminal Code of 1997 uses the following conceptual grid in the ana-
lyzed area: 
• person helpless due to that person’s age (Art. 53 § 2, Art. 189 § 2a, Art. 
207 § 1a), 
• children (Art. 118 § 2, Art. 211a), 
• child (Art. 149), 
• person to whom a duty to take care is owed (Art. 160 § 2), 
• minor (Art. 115 § 22, Art. 199 § 2, Art. 202, Art. 204 § 4, Art. 208); and 
minor under the age of 15 (Art. 197 § 3 item 2, Art. 200, Art. 200a, Art. 
210, Art. 211),
• infant (Art. 149 in the former wording effective for a relatively short 
period of time).
The above list shows the course of the evolution of the wording of the young-
est victims. A characteristic feature of the Criminal Code of 1932 lies in its use 
of the term juvenile for both the victim and the perpetrator. The definition of a 
juvenile may partially be reconstructed on the basis of Art. 69–72 of the Crimi-
nal Code of 1932, in the light of which a juvenile is a person up to the age of 21. 
The liability of a juvenile was dependent on the following time limits: commit-
ting an act before reaching the age of 13, between the age of 13 and 17 and after 
attaining the age of 17. Other time limits were important to classify juveniles 
as victims from the perspective of the protection of their rights, namely: being 
under 15, 17 and 21 years of age. It should also be noted that in addition to the 
concept of a juvenile, the code also includes the category of „a person under 
15 years of age,“ which somewhat undermines the system outlined above. That 
terminological disorder was exacerbated by the fact that in other provisions the 
legislator used the term „child.“ Notably, the dictionary entry for the term child 
has two basic meanings: „1. human being from birth to adolescence; 2. human 
descendant regardless of age, son or daughter.”10 The legislator of 1932 used the 
concept of the child in the first sense, and therefore as a synonym for the then 
concept of juvenile. At the same time, the legislator applied the term “child” also 
10 Available at:https://sjp.pl/dziecko, Accessed at: 27.01.2019.
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in the second sense to denote the offspring (e.g., both of these situations occur 
when criminalizing the so-called prostitution-related offenses – Article 212). 
It was certainly not the most appropriate legislative procedure. In contrast, the 
terms “person to whom a duty to take care or provide supervision is owed” and 
“person being in a relation of dependence” seem to be fully justified given that 
they appear in provisions that apply not only to the youngest. Above all, the cited 
terms define a certain relation between the perpetrator and the victim, which 
becomes an important element of the determination of prohibited acts. 
The legislator preparing the Criminal Code in 1969 abandoned the use of the 
term juvenile to denote the victim, introducing instead the concept of „minor“ 
derived from the Civil Code. To further complicate matters, the Criminal Code 
of 1969 also features the concept of „person under 15 years of age“ in as many 
as three regulations. Thus, the attempt to organize the subject matter ended in 
moderate success. The positive elements surely include the abandonment of the 
use of the term „child“ to identify the non-adult victim. The provisions using 
the concept of child (Art. 149 – infanticide and Art. 186 § 1 – failure to provide 
maintenance) indicate the relation between the perpetrator and the victim rather 
than focus on the age of the victim.
Given the above, it is astonishing that the legislator preparing the Criminal 
Code in 1997 strayed from the chosen path to reintroduce the concept of child 
in the sense of a non-adult person (cf. e.g. Article 118 § 2 of the Criminal Code 
– extermination), while eliminating entirely the concept of „person under the 
age of 15,” which should be noted with appreciation. The amendment adopted 
in 2015 introduced a new concept of “person helpless due to that person’s age“ 
in order to strengthen, as it was declared, the criminal protection of the child. 
Putting aside the assessment of the appropriateness of such a solution (in par-
ticular in the context of the place where such wording appears in various code 
regulations),11 it should be noted that the phrase „person helpless due to that 
person’s age“ is not a close synonym for the concept of a child or minor. Truly, 
it may apply to some adults (in particular, the elderly) who have more or less 
limited physical, mental or intellectual efficiency due to their age. At the same 
time, not every child (minor) may be deemed helpless due to age. In the case of 
a child who is physically, intellectually and mentally mature and is independent 
and resourceful, the category “person helpless due to that person’s age” clearly 
does not apply. Therefore, in cases where the legislator uses this concept in a 
specific provision, that provision will apply to all children (minors) and each 
time the court will have to examine whether the injured child is indeed helpless. 
11 Further analysis of that concept and its functions are presented in the following article: 
SITARZ, Olga, BEK, Dominika, Czy zasadnie i skutecznie ustawodawca podwyższył poziom 
ochrony małoletnich? Krytyczna analiza nowelizacji kodeksu karnego z 23 marca 2017 r., 
Forum Prawnicze 2017, vol. 6, no 44, pp. 8–24.
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Another very serious interpretative problem arises from the establishment of 
time limits of the concepts of minor and juvenile. Seemingly, as these are norma-
tive terms, the matter seems simple – the relevant laws set these limits. However, 
that is not the case.
With regard to the concept of the minor, it is necessary to determine precisely 
the start of childhood. It is the moment that radically differentiates the criminal 
law response to the violation of the subject‘s interests. The principles of liability 
in Polish criminal law are established differently depending on whether the sub-
ject’s interests are violated before or after its birth. By way of example, violations 
of interest in the form of life may be indicated. If committed before childbirth, 
such a violation is referred to as an abortion. Then only intentional conduct is 
punishable and a pregnant woman is not liable to a penalty if she performs the 
abortion herself. In comparison, the killing of a child after its birth constitutes 
murder or, alternatively, infanticide and is punishable both when committed 
intentionally and unintentionally. The mother also bears criminal liability, but 
in the case of infanticide, i.e., during and under the influence of delivery, the 
penalty is significantly mitigated.
There have thus far been three main theories in the science of criminal law 
determining the start of childhood / initial moment of a born person. Those three 
groups of views situate the moment when a conceived child becomes a human 
being within the meaning of criminal law during childbirth, although they relate 
it to its various phases. The earliest indicated moment is the beginning of labor 
(so-called obstetrics criterion). While remaining within the limits laid down in 
the Criminal Code, that view specifies the widest scope of protection. Represent-
atives of the other views see that moment when a newborn child starts to breathe 
independently with its own lungs (so-called physiological criterion), sometimes 
adding the condition of complete physical separation from the mother‘s body, or 
at the moment of complete or partial leaving the mother‘s womb (so-called phys-
ical or spatial criterion). The latter cases naturally foresee a narrower scope of 
protection compared to the obstetrics criterion.12 All in all, in line with the case 
law of the Supreme Court, the full criminal law protection should be given from 
„a) the beginning of (natural) delivery, b) in the case of surgical caesarean sec-
tion terminating pregnancy at the request of a pregnant woman – from the first 
medical activity directly aimed at carrying out such surgery, c) in case of medi-
cal necessity to perform a caesarean section or other alternative termination of 
pregnancy – from the occurrence of medical premises of such necessity.”13 It is 
thus a moment well in advance of what is typically understood as „birth,“ but 
such regulations stem from the intention of granting the child before its birth the 
same level of protection as after the birth. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court noted 
the disparity in the criminal law protection of the life of an unborn child during 
12 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 26.10.2006, I KZP 18/06, Lex.
13 Decision of the Supreme Court of 30.10. 2008, I KZP 13/08, Lex.
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a normal pregnancy ending in natural delivery and in the event of the pregnancy 
ending with a Caesarean section, but as announced in its judgment, that dispar-
ity can only be removed by the legislator.14 Pursuant to the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland, the rulings of the Supreme Court do not constitute a source 
of law, but given the fact that it supervises the operation of common and military 
courts in the area of adjudication and it enjoys high prestige, its judgments have 
a huge impact on the interpretation of law and its application.
The indication of the upper limit of minority is only seemingly easier. When 
seeking to establish that limit – in the absence of relevant regulations in the 
Criminal Code – lawyers consistently draw on civil law which defines that term. 
Account should after all be taken of the legal consequences of incorporating into 
criminal law a civil law term which is subject to a specific modification pursu-
ant to yet another act. More precisely, the provision of Art. 10 of the Civil Code 
stipulates that an adult is any individual who attained eighteen years of age and 
that a minor becomes an adult upon marriage. Pursuant to Art. 10 of the Family 
and Guardianship Code, for valid reasons, the guardianship court may allow a 
woman who has reached the age of sixteen to marry, where the circumstances 
indicate that the marriage will be in the best interest of the newly established 
family. The question thus arises whether the concept of a minor in criminal law 
should be understood only in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code 
(which means a person under 18 years of age), or in accordance with (the whole) 
civil law system, which in essence means any person up to the age of 18, unless 
it is a woman who attained the age of 16 and got married upon consent of the 
court. In other words, the issue is whether marriage of a girl concluded before 
she reaches the age of 18 changes her status in criminal law, i.e. deprives her of 
the status of a minor. As a case in point, let us imagine treating a 17-year-old 
bride (i.e. after she entered into marriage) to an alcoholic drink at her wedding 
reception, whilst the provision of Art. 208 of the Criminal Code states: „Who 
induces a minor to become an inveterate drinker by providing him/her with an 
alcoholic drink, facilitating its consumption or persuading him/her to consume 
such beverage, shall be subject to a fine, the penalty of limitation of liberty or the 
penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to 2 years.“
14 Decision of the Supreme Court of 30.10.2008, I KZP 13/08, Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego – Izba Karna I Wojskowa 2008, no. 11, pos. 90, with a critical comment by 
A.T. Olszewskiego, Lex. 
In connection with the thesis of the Supreme Court raising some issues concerning the dispar-
ity in the protection of health (and life) of a healthy and unhealthy fetus (where a caesarian 
section is necessary) and the related postulate advanced by T. Sroka. In his opinion, “an 
intervention by the legislator appears to be necessary in order to extend the scope of the 
criminal law protection of human life against unintended attempts at that legal interest to 
include every case where a conceived child developed the capacity to love independently 
outside the mother’s body.” – SROKA, Tomasz, Odpowiedzialność karna za niewłaściwe 
leczenie. Problematyka obiektywnego przypisania skutku. Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer Polska, 
2013, p. 82. 
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One should not lose sight of the general reservation expressed by the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child: “in some States Parties married children are 
legally considered adults, even if they are under 18, depriving them of all the spe-
cial protection measures they are entitled under the Convention. The Committee 
strongly recommends that States Parties review, and where necessary, reform 
their legislation and practice to increase the minimum age for marriage with and 
without parental consent to 18 years, for both girls and boys. (…) The Commit-
tee on the Rights of the Child has repeatedly emphasized to many States Parties 
that the age of marriage for both girls and boys must be the same to conform 
with article 2 of the Convention.”15 In 1994 the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) made a General Recommendation 
on equality in marriage and family relations, which proposes that the minimum 
age for marriage should be 18 for both women and men.16
Giving further consideration to the temporal scope of the concept of a 
(minor) child in Polish criminal law, one cannot ignore the fact that the special 
criminal law protection is not always extended to the entire period of childhood 
(minority). Criminal law divides the time of minority into periods – a certain 
behavior is a crime if it concerns children of a certain age or is a crime punish-
able by a more severe penalty when it involves a child. By comparison, in the 
situation where children are older, the behavior defined in such a provision does 
not constitute a crime or misdemeanor. 
The following time periods in childhood differentiating protection can be 
indicated:
a. birth – granting the so-called full criminal law protection (for instance, 
the unintentional causing of death of a newborn child is a crime, while 
it does not constitute a crime in the prenatal phase);
b. the first 24/48 hours of life – up to that point in the life of the child, the 
mother incurs a lighter penalty in the event of the child being killed 
under the influence of delivery (Art. 149 of the Criminal Code);
c. up to 7 years of age – allowing a child to remain unattended on a public 
road constitutes a petty offense (Art. 89 of the Code of Petty Offenses);
d. up to 10 years of age – the organization of traffic of a column of such 
pedestrians on the road in conditions of insufficient visibility consti-
tutes a petty offense (Art. 12 item 7.2 of the Road Traffic Act in con-
junction with Art. 97 of the Code of Petty Offenses);
15 Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, prepared for 
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e. up to 13 years of age – allowing a child, inter alia, to lead animals on a 
hard road is a petty offense (Art. 37 item 4.2 of the Road Traffic Act in 
conjunction with Art. 97 of the Code of Petty Offenses);
f. up to 15 years of age – engaging in sexual intercourse or another sexual 
activity with a minor who has not attained that age is a crime (Art. 200 
of the Criminal Code); however, rape of a minor under 15 years of age 
is a qualified crime and thus punishable by a more severe penalty (Art. 
197 § 3 of the Criminal Code);
g. up to 17 years old of age – neglect of upbringing responsibilities while 
caring for a child up to that age leading to demoralization is a crime 
(Art. 105 of the Criminal Code);
h. up to 18 years of age – for instance, providing a person of that age 
with an alcoholic beverage is a crime (Art. 208 of the Criminal Code); 
whereas, among others, deriving material benefits from prostitution 
practiced by a minor is a qualified crime, thus punishable by a more 
severe penalty (Art. 204 § 3 of the Criminal Code). 
The indicated age limits are proof that the legislator recognizes the growing 
maturity of children providing them with greater freedom and opportunity to 
exercise control over their interest. The legislator is also well aware of the lack of 
the need for prescribing maximum protection in some areas in view of the evolv-
ing resourcefulness and independence of children.
The protection of the child in the prenatal phase should be recognized as a 
separate issue of criminal law protection. The concept of the minor examined 
above does not include that phase of life. In legal language, the study of civil 
law often uses the term nasciturus, but much less often the term a man in statu 
nascendi or conceptus. In general, the causing of death of a conceived child con-
stitutes a criminal offense in Polish criminal law (with three exceptions),17 as is 
the case with causing a bodily injury. A conceived child or, in other terms, life 
in the prenatal phase is also subject to time limits. The establishment of limits 
in that case is by no means easy either, and the matter is further complicated by 
the fact that the Polish Criminal Code uses two terms “the conceived child” and 
“pregnancy,” which are to a certain extent synonymous, even in one provision of 
law. Another difficulty lies in the fact that the Act providing for the extraordinary 
possibility of terminating pregnancy uses the term fetus.
It is most commonly assumed that pregnancy is a woman‘s condition from 
conception to delivery.18 The beginning of pregnancy is determined slightly dif-
17 Act of 7 January 1993 on Family Planning, Human Fetus Protection and Conditions of Per-
missibility of Abortion, Journal of Laws. 1993 no. 17 pos. 78.
18 Cf. for instance GIEZEK, Jacek. In GIEZEK, Jacek (eds), Kodeks karny. Część szczególna. 
Komentarz, Warsow: Wolters Kluwer, 2014, p. 199.
 The definition proposed by M. Królikowski, which appears to be isolated, states that preg-
nancy is a biological and personal relation between the woman and the conceived child 
taking place in her organism, occurring upon fertilization and lasting until the delivery 
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ferently in medical sciences – implantation of a fertilized egg (blastocyst) in the 
uterine endometrium (nidation)19 or outside the uterus (most often within the 
fallopian tube – the so-called ectopic pregnancy). The acceptance of one of the 
two competing interpretations of the term „pregnancy“ is of utmost importance 
for the criminal assessment of the use and provision of contraceptives that pre-
vent the implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus (including the intrauterine 
device). It appears that the statutory differentiation of the prenatal phase made 
in the provision of Art. 152 into „pregnancy“ (§1) and „conceived child“ (§3) 
allows for the application of the indications accepted in medicine to the inter-
pretation of the provision of law.20 All in all, a conceived child means a human 
being from the moment of conception (regardless of the possibility of medical 
determination of its existence in the first hours of that phase).
In the simplest terms, pregnancy and also the status of a conceived child end 
with the birth of the child. That is the moment of adjustment of the theories cited 
above determining the moment of birth, as well as the theses of the Supreme 
Court which points to the three aforementioned moments of the full implemen-
tation of criminal law protection, and therefore the end of the prenatal phase.
In the light of criminal law, the prenatal phase is divided into two periods, 
which means that periodization also occurs at that stage. The turning point is 
reached once a conceived child develops the capacity to live independently out-
side the mother‘s body. Consequently, the perpetrator‘s criminal liability for 
abortion in the first or second phase of pregnancy is different. The provision of 
Art. 152 § 3 provides for the so-called qualified type – the perpetrators of the 
defined acts (i.e. termination of pregnancy, aiding and abetting) are subject to 
a more severe criminal liability regime in the event where the conceived child 
has developed the capacity to live independently outside the mother‘s body. It 
is assumed that the fetus acquires that capacity after 6 months of pregnancy. 
Pursuant to the criteria adopted by the WHO, the fetus acquires the capacity to 
survive outside the mother‘s body in the 21st week of pregnancy, after reach-
– KRÓLIKOWSKI, Michał. In: KRÓLIKOWSKI, Michał, ZAWŁOCKI, Robert, Kodeks 
karny. Część szczególna. Vol. I, Warsaw: C.H. Beck, 2013, p. 243.
19 PLEBANEK, Ewa, Przestępstwa aborcyjne – praktyczna interpretacja znamion czynności 
wykonawczej, Prawo i medycyna 2011, no. 4, p. 35.
20 Also M. Safjan points to nidation as the start of pregnancy indicating the change occurring 
in the woman’s body since that moment, which allows for the determination of pregnancy – 
SAFJAN, Marek, Prawo wobec ingerencji w naturę ludzkiej prokreacji, Warsaw: Uniwersytet 
Warszawski, 1990, p. 317. However, it appears that the argument of functionality should 
be of a secondary nature in relation to medical indications, also KONARSKA-WRZOSEK, 
Violetta. In: KONARSKA-WRZOSEK, Violetta (eds.), Kodeks karny. Komentarz, Warsaw: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2016, p. 745.
 R. Kubiak is of a similar opinion arguing that the Act on Family Planning and Art. 152 do 
not apply to abortifacients given that there can be no pregnancy before nidation (implanta-
tion of a fertilized egg) – KUBIAK, Rafał, Prawo medyczne, Warsow: C.H. Beck, 2014, pp. 
496–497.
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ing a body weight of 500 grams.21 In the opinion of B. Michalski, the indicated 
qualifying element implies such a stage of development of a conceived child 
that the organs performing basic life functions, in particular breathing, are fully 
formed.22 A. Zoll adds that the issue concerns the chance of survival of the child 
using appropriate devices (e.g. an incubator) after removing it from the mother’s 
body.23 Under this approach, it seems that the limitation of the qualified type by 
specifying the capacity to live outside the mother‘s body by means of adding the 
wording „independently“ is totally unnecessary. Moreover, the interpretation of 
that article must lead to contra legem conclusions or a breach of the prohibition 
of per non est interpretation.
The figure opposite to the injured child in criminal law regulations is the 
child perpetrator of a prohibited act. The legal synonyms (to some extent) of 
the concept of a child perpetrator of a criminal act are the terms juvenile and 
young adult. The age limits for a juvenile established in the Criminal Code differ 
from those set by the Act on Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings and are entirely 
distinct from the age limits for a minor.
The Criminal Code, regardless of the provisions of civil law, establishes the age 
for adulthood at 17 years of age (Art. 10 § 1). The exceptional liability of a minor 
aged 15–17 is provided for in § 2 of that provision stating that a juvenile who hav-
ing attained the age of 15 commits an offense specified in Art. 134, Art. 148 § 1, 2 
3, Art. 156 § 1 3, Art. 163 § 1 3, Art. 166, Art. 173 § 1 3, Art. 197 § 3, Art. 252 § 1 
2 and in Art. 280 may be liable under the rules set out in the code, provided that 
the circumstances of the case and the degree of development of the perpetrator, 
his properties and personal conditions give grounds for it, in particular, where the 
previously applied educational or corrective measures proved ineffective. 
The Act on Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings indicates three categories 
of young offenders referred to as juveniles. The first category includes per-
sons younger than 18 years of age who show symptoms of demoralization and 
there is a need to prevent and combat their demoralization. The minimum age 
for juveniles displaying signs of demoralization is not provided by the Act on 
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings (1982). In the opinion of P. Daniluk and J. 
Mierzwińska-Lorencka, it is a solution fully legitimate and reasonable. The need 
to initiate appropriate proceedings in the juvenile case due to demoralization 
should determine the real purpose of preventing demoralization.24 The literature 
21 KANIA, Agnieszka Maria, Kontrowersje związane z kryminalizacją przerywania ciąży. 
Część I, Nowa Kodyfikacja Prawa karnego, 2011, vol. Tom XXVII, no 3325, p. 102.
22 MICHALSKI, Bogdan. In WĄSEK, Andrzej (ed.), Kodeks karny. Część szczególna. Vol. I. 
Komentarz, Warsaw: C.H. Beck, 2004, p. 271.
23 ZOLL, Andrzej. In ZOLL, Andrzej (ed), Kodeks karny. Część szczególna. Tom II, Komentarz 
do art. 177–227, Cracow: Zakamycze, 1999, p. 336.
24 DANILUK, Paweł, MIERZWIŃSKA-LORENCKA, Joanna, Responsibility of a Juvenile for 
a Prohibited Act under Polish Law, International and Comparative Law Review, 2016, Vol. 
16, No. 2, pp. 109–110.
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review provides another justification for the lack of lower age limit for signs of 
demoralization. T. Bojarski writes that it is difficult to indicate below what age 
a child will not need help. It is not surprising, therefore, that judicial practice 
records juvenile proceedings even involving children under the age of nine.25 
The second category includes juveniles who committed a punishable act after 
having reached 13 years of age, but before having attained the age of 17. The 
lower limit of 13 years refers to the division of juveniles adopted in the Criminal 
Code of 1932 in which division into two age groups of juveniles was made, i.e. 
up to the age of 13 as acting without discernment, and from 13 to 17 years as a 
group of juveniles for whom the statutory presumption assumed that they act 
with discernment, although exceptions were possible. The upper limit set at 17 
years of age bears a close relation to the principle laid down in the system of 
criminal law that a person may be held criminally liable only when at the time of 
the commission of the offence they attained at least the age of 17. 
The last category of juveniles are persons under the age of 21, where the rules 
of the Act on Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings are applicable for the purpose 
of the implementation of educational or correctional measures imposed by the 
court. Juveniles who after having reached the age of 17 commit a punishable 
act or after having attained 18 years of age show other signs of demoralization 
cannot be subject to the regulation, even though the educational or correctional 
measures were carried out earlier. In terms of the performance of educational or 
correctional measures, the rules of the Act on Juvenile Delinquency Proceed-
ings shall apply to a certain category of “adult offenders” who have committed a 
prohibited act such as an offence, fiscal offence or fiscal petty offence at the age of 
criminal responsibility (after having attained 17 years of age, but before having 
attained the age of 18) if the criminal court hearing the case deems it appropri-
ate instead of imposing a punishment or educational or correctional measures 
intended for juveniles. The literature and case law review indicates that the defi-
nition of that category of offenders as juveniles is wrong. In fact, as regards young 
adults who are treated as if they were juveniles, the provisions of Polish criminal 
law clearly indicate that the attainment of 17 years of age marks the end of the 
period of being juvenile.26
The above Polish solutions must be confronted with the provisions of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child referred to above. Article 40(3)(a) of the 
Convention proposes “the establishment of a minimum age below which chil-
dren shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law.” In its 
25 BOJARSKI, Tadeusz. In BOJARSKI, Tadeusz, KRUK, Ewa, SKRĘTOWICZ, Edward (ed.), 
Ustawa o postępowaniu w sprawach nieletnich. Komentarz, Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer 2014, 
p. 41.
26 DANILUK, Paweł, MIERZWIŃSKA-LORENCKA, Joanna, Responsibility of a Juvenile for 
a Prohibited Act under Polish Law, International and Comparative Law Review, 2016, Vol. 
16, No. 2, pp. 109–110.
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General Comment No. 10 on “Children’s rights in Juvenile Justice,” the Com-
mittee urges States not to set the minimum age at too low a level and to con-
tinue to raise the age to an internationally acceptable level. It is clear, from the 
Initial and Periodic Reports of States Parties and from the reports of discussions 
with the Committee, that the definition of the age of criminal responsibility is 
often blurred. In some States, it appears, paradoxically, that children can be liable 
under criminal law for major offences at a younger age than they can be liable 
for minor offences. The Committee has, in several cases, underlined that a mini-
mum age must be defined in legislation. For many States, the Committee has 
urged that the age should be raised, and the Committee has welcomed proposals 
to set the age at 18. For example: “The Committee urges the State Party to raise 
the minimum age of criminal responsibility and to ensure that children aged 15 
to 18 years are accorded the protection of juvenile justice provisions and are not 
treated as adults.”27
Polish criminal law also uses the term “young adult” referring to a young 
offender, who is not always a child, although the ranges of these two terms over-
lap. The legislator adopted the criterion of the child‘s age at the time when the 
judgement is pronounced and, simultaneously fulfilling the postulates advanced 
in the doctrine, determined the status of young adult in the 1997 Criminal 
Code by reference to the age of the perpetrator at the time of commission of 
the offense.28 Pursuant to the provision of Art. 115 § 10 of the Criminal Code, 
a young adult is a perpetrator who has not attained 21 years of age at the time 
of the commission of a prohibited act and 24 years of age at the time of pro-
nouncing the judgment in the first instance. Within the meaning of criminal law, 
juveniles committing an offense, i.e., at the age of 15–17, shall simultaneously be 
deemed to be young adults as long as the judgment in their case is pronounced 
in the first instance before they attain the age of 24. In the event where for any 
reasons the criminal proceedings are prolonged and the sentence is pronounced 
after such a specified period, the perpetrator shall no longer hold the status of 
young adult (still remaining a juvenile). Notably, not all young adults are juve-
niles. If, at the time of the commission of the act, the perpetrator is, for instance, 
18 years old, whereas at the time when the judgment is pronounced attains the 
age of 23, then he/she is a young adult, but not a juvenile. Those differentiations 
are of relevance for imposing a penalty for a committed offense and, above all, 
for serving a penalty of deprivation of liberty.
27 Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, prepared for 
UNICEF by Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell, 2007, p. 10. [online]. Available at:
http://www.unicef.org.tr/files/bilgimerkezi/doc/Implementation_Handbook_for_the_Con-
vention_on_the_Rights_of_the_Child.pdf, Accessed: 28.11.2019
28 MAJEWSKI, Jarosław, Komentarz do art. 115 of the Criminal Code. In WRÓBEL, 
Włodzimierz, ZOLL, Andrzej (ed), Kodeks karny. Część ogólna. Tom I, Część II. Komentarz 
do art. 53–116, Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer, 2016, LEX/el.
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4. Conclusions
In conclusion, an analysis of the Polish solutions regarding the establishment 
and definition of childhood limits reveals a profound lack of coherence between 
the limits set in the case of harm and in the case of perpetration. The legisla-
tive decisions take into account the slowly evolving maturity of a young person 
on the physical, mental, intellectual and, above all, social level in a somewhat 
diverse and arbitrary manner. With certain terminological chaos (synonymous 
meanings of different terms) and a lack of precision, the overall assessment of the 
Polish regulations in that area is not overly positive. 
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